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hibiiion : Herbert v. Easton, 43 Ala. 547; 11iltiants v. Haines, 27
Iowa 251; -utland v. Copes, 15 Rich. 84; Kirtland v. J1.olton,
41 Ala. 548. But on the other hand, where a mortgage contained
a power to the creditor to sell on breach of condition, it was held
that a subsequent law giving the mortgagor twelve months to redeem
the property from the purchaser at such sale, so altered the remedy
of the creditor as to impair- the obligation of the contract- TANEY,
C. J., said: " If such rights may be added to the original contract
by-subsequent legislation, it would be difficult to say at what point
they must stop. An equitable interest in the premises may, in like
manner, be conferred upon others ; and the right to redeem may be
so prolonged as to deprive the mortgagee of the benefit of his secu-
rity, byrendering the property unsalable for anything like its value:"
R6ronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 ; Howard v. Bugbee, 24 Id. 461;
Talony v. Fortune, 14 rowa 417. And again, a state law forbid-
ding_ property levied on execution to be sold for less than two-thirds
of its_ appraised value, so far obstructs the remedy as to impair the
obligation of the contract, and cannot apply to debts accrued before
its passage: life6C'acken v. Hayward, 29 How. 608 ; Moore v. Yow-
ler, 1 Hemp. 536.
XIV. State Constitutions. -State constitutions are "laws" within
the meaning of the limitation : Bailroadv. McClure, 10 Wall. 511;
Lehigh Valley Ed. Co. v. Afe ar[an, 81 N. J. Eq. 706. But
"there is nothing in the constitution of the United States which
forbids Congress to pass laws violating the obligation of contracts,
although such a power is denied to the states individually :" E-vans
v. -Eaton, Pet. C. C. 337.
HI. CAMPBELL BLACK.
Williamsport, Pa.
RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
High Court of Justice ; Probate Division.
HAWKINS v. HAWKINS & HOPE.
A petitioner and respondent separated by mutual consentshortly after the marriago,,
and only mt once afterwards. The petitioner alloiwed her a small sum for her sup-
port, and sixteen years after tlhe marriage discovered that she had committed adul
ery: lietu, under the circumstanca, that the petitioner had conduccd to the adid-
tery. Petition dismissed.
Tris was a petition for the dissolution of marriage by reason of
the adultery of the wife.
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The parties were married on the 13th of Ju*Ly 1863, at St. James'
Church, Piccadilly. The petitioner had become acquainted with
the respondent (who was a shop girl) some short time previously,
and had been improperly intimate wiith her, and compelled by her
father to marry her. At the time of the marriage the petitioner
was entirely dependent upon his uncle and aunt, and it was arranged
between him and the respondent that the marriage should be kept
secret.
A few days after the marriage the parties separated and never
cohabited again, the petitioner allowing his wife from 21. to 41. a
month, which he remitted to her by letter. They met once at
Charing Cross about sixteen years after the marriage, when some-
thing was said about living together, but neither party seemed
desirous of doing so. With that exception they had not seen each
other until shortly before the institution of this suit, when the peti-
tioner discovered that the respondent had been, for some years, living
in adultery. The petitioner's uncle died in 1870 leaving all his
property to the aunt, and she died in 1881, bequeathing a consider-
able fortune to the petitioner.
The respondent's adultery. was proved, and she was called as a
witness in support of her case.
Sir J. HANNEN (President).-The petitioner in this case seduced
the respondent when she was a young woman, and her father having
brought pressure upon him to marry her, the petitioner required
her to keep the marriage secret, as if it was known to'the uncle'and
aunt they would not leave him their property; but even after the
uncle's death the petitioner continued to live apart from his wtfe,
although he introduced her to his aunt as the person whom he in-
tended to marry. Every husband is bound to give his wife that
protection which the society of a husband affords, and the fact that
the respondent had been familiar with him before marriage made
that duty more incumbent upon him, she being a person who might
be more likely to yield to temptation. Having regard, therefore,
to the petitioner's conduct in leaving his wife withoui a husband's
-protection, and being of opinion that that conduct conduced to her
adultery, I consider that he is not entitled to a dissolution of his
marriage. Petition dismissed with costs.
Collusion and connivance, it is univer- obtaining a divorce. They both are but
sally agreed, prevent a husband from phases or shades of the same disposition,
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intent, desire or willingness on the part
of the husband that his wife shall commit
some act, which is by statute made a
cause of divorce. The divorce statutes
seldom, if ever, expressly declare that
such conduct of the husband shall bar
his divorcer but inasmuch as their lan-
guage generally is that divorces "may
be" granted for such and such causes,
the courts practically interpret it to
mean that in some cases they may not
be, and-that in their discretion they can
and will refuse it, although the act
alleged be fully proved, if the husband
himself has been a consenting party,
though not guilty of any similar act, or
of any conduct warranting a divorce on
the wife's application.
Indeed, the law of recrimination rests
upon a similar ground. Thestatute law
does not expressly say that adultery by
the husband is an absolute bar to ob-
taining- a divorce from the wife for the
same cause, nor rke versa.
But the courts refuse to exercise their
power in all such cases, on the broad
ground that a party guilty of violating
the marriage bond shall not have the
assistance of the court to enforce any
marital right: Hope v. flope, I Sw. &
Tr. 107.
And connivance is a bar therefore, on
the broad general ground that consent
takes away any remedy. Vrolenti non fit
injuria.
Therefore, it was held in Pierce v.
Pierce, 3 Pick. 299 (1825), that though
the adultery-of the wife was proved, the di-
vorce must be refused, because there was
"reason to think that the husband was
the cause of its being committed." "It
would be," say the court, "a dangerous
principle to establish, that a husband
who had suspicions of the infidelity of
his wife, shall be allowed to -lay a train
which may lead her to the commission of
adultery, in order that he may take ad-
vantage of it to obtain a divorce. As
we are clear that the adultery proved
was committed with the knowledge and
consent of the libellant, and probably
with his connivance, a divorce will not-
be granted."
Actual "connivance," therefore, is
always recognised as a bap to a decree.
See Cairns v. Cairns, 109 Mass. 408.
The more delicate question is what
state of mind, or will, on the part of
a, husband, not amounting to contrivance
or connivance exactly, but merely will-
ingness, or perhaps indifference on his
part is sufficient to have the same effect.
This question arose in Morrison v. Mor-
risen, 136 Mass. 310 (1884>, in which
the judge who tried the cause found sim-
ply this state of facts : " The husband
did no act directly to encourage the adul-
tery in his wife, and he did nothing to
prevent it. He went to bed-early, some-
times leaving her and another man to-
gether in the sitting room, and suspecting
that they might commit adultery, and
knowing that the detective previously
employed by him, would probably be on7
the watch to discover it ; he made no re-
monstrance or objection against their
being together ; he concealed his suspi-
cions from both of them; he took no pains
to protect herfrom seduction. And from
the various circumstances," said the
judge," I find. thatfrom the time when his
suspicions were first excited. he was in
his own mind willing that she should
commit adultery, provided he could there-
by obtain a divorce; and he expected
that she would commit adultery, and that
he should obtain proof of it, and thus
be enabled to procure a divorce." And
his refusal to grant a divorce was sus-
tained by theL full court, on his report
whether his decision was right. The
court say that this was sufficient to
warrant the finding of connivance,
whether they should or should not have
drawn the same inference from the ex-
isting facts. If there was any mistake
here, it was in drawing too unfavorable
a conclusion against the hnshbnnd from
the factq actually proved. The prcsid-
ing judge does not exactly say, on his
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report, that he found the actual fact of a guilty, but no corrupt intent that adul-
"c connivance," although the court above tery should be committed, nor any con-
seem to have so considered it. "sent to it, or connivance at it. And it
Mr. Bishop, in his valuable book on was held that the husband was entitled
Marriage and Divorce, thus states the to his divorce.
law on this point: But whatever may be the law of con-
"The law requires the husband to nivance, or from whatever acts that fact
watch over the morals of his wife; and may be considered as sufficiently proved,
protect her against associations which it is obvious that the principal case goes
might expose to hazard her purity, or a step further-and a very important
by lowering her standard of virtue, pre- step further-in the law of divorce. It
pare the way for the approaches of the is not claimed that the husband in any
seducer. Hence, while his want of at- way consented, assented, or desired the
tention to her selection of associates, to adultery of his wife, or knew of its
her morals, and to her conduct in other probability, or that she was actually ex-
respects, is not of itself connivance, it posed to any danger. The whole aver-
may be strong, sometimes satisfactory ment simply is, that by separating from
evidence of it :" 2 Mar. and Div., sect. her, by mutual consent, he thereby,
17. Elsewhere he says, that though although continuing to support her,
connivance may be passive as well as exposed her to danger, and therefore
active, yet there must be a complete "conduced "to the violation of her mar-
consent on his part; and there can be riage vow. If this be legal cause for re-
no connivance without such consent, ac- fusing a divorce, few divorces would be
tive or passive ; and as the law does not granted. It is comparatively seldom
take cognisance of thought merely, there there is not some fault, or neglect, to
must be some act, word, or omission of be found on the part of the husband, ere
duty blending with a passive willingness a wife will be guilty of such misconduct.
to have the wrong committed. And And if such acts, merely as inattention,
that a real intention to have the wife neglect, and the like, establish " conduce-
transgress; or at least an intention to ment," and so bar him from divorce for
allow her to do so undisturbed and un- her adultery, it can be but regarded as
prevented, must exist in order to amount establishing a very important principle
to connivance, very distinctly appears in this branch of the law.
from the important cases of Pihiips v. Perhaps the strnogest case in our
Phillips, 3 Notes of Cases 444; 4 Id. American courts looking to such a conclu-
524; Moorsom v. Mloorsom, 3 Hagg. 105 ; sion is that of Barber v. Barber, 14 Law
Hoar v. Hoar, Id. 137 ; Hges v. Ho- Rep. 375 (1851) in the Superior Court
ges, Id. 123. of Connecticut. The libel by the bus-
Elsewhere, however, it is said, that band wason the ground of '"habitual
"willing acquiescence in the continua- intemperance." The defence was that
tion of an adulterous intercourse by the the wife, being sick and nervous, ac-
other party is sufficient." See Bodting quired the habit of taking large quanti-
v. Boulting, 3 Sw. & Tr. 335 (1864). tics of morphine, which th6 husband pro-
. The necessity of corrupt intention to cured for her, with the advice of her
constitute connivance, was also distinctly physician: and that subsequently, in
held by the Supreme Court of Massachu- order to wean her from its use, she, with
setts, in the very recent case of Robbins his advice, began to take large quanti-
v. Robbins, yet unreported. The evi- ties of gin, which he procured for her.
deuce there clearly showed a scheme to This was held to prevent him from oh-
detect the libellee in adultery if she was tamining his divorce, although the judge
